

# **Exhibit 3**

## **Public Redacted Version**

1  
2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
3 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
4 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

5 -----X  
6 IN RE GOOGLE PLAY STORE Case No.  
7 ANTITRUST LITIGATION 3:21-md-02981-JD

8 THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:

9 Epic Games Inc. v. Google LLC, et al.,  
Case No: 3:20-cv-05671-JD

10 In re Google Play Consumer  
11 Antitrust Litigation,  
Case No: 3:20-cv-05761-JD

12 In re Google Play Developer  
13 Antitrust Litigation,  
Case No: 3:20-cv-05792-JD

14 State of Utah, et al., v.  
15 Google LLC, et al.,  
Case No: 3:21-cv-05227-JD

16 -----X

17  
18 \*HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - UNDER PROTECTIVE ORDER\*

19  
20 REMOTE VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION BY VIRTUAL ZOOM OF  
21 JAMES KOLOTOUROS  
22 February 2, 2022  
23 9:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time  
24

25 Reported by: Fran Insley

1 KOLOTOUROS - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL  
2 the Witness herein, having first been duly  
3 sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and  
4 testified as follows:

5 EXAMINATION BY MS. MOSKOWITZ:

6 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kolotouros.

7 A. Good morning.

8 Q. I've just said your name, but if you  
9 wouldn't mind, please, stating your name, full  
10 name for the record.

11 A. Jim Kolotouros.

12 Q. And can you provide your address?

13 A. My home address or my current  
14 address for the -- where I'm seated?

15 Q. I was going to ask where you were  
16 currently sitting second, but if you could give  
17 your work or home address as you prefer.

18 A. I am currently in the law offices of  
19 Morgan Lewis on 1400 Page Mill Road in Palo  
20 Alto, and my work address is 1600 Amphitheater  
21 Parkway, Mountain View, California, 94043.

22 Q. Is there anyone in the room with you  
23 now?

24 A. No, there is not.

25 Q. If someone does enter the room, do

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2 A. I would include the development NDA  
3 as an agreement of substance.

4 Q. That's a Confidentiality Agreement?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. So, in addition to the NDA or  
7 Confidentiality Agreement, we have the MADA,  
8 the RSA, and the -- either the AFA or ACC?

9 A. It's the ACC and the MADA and the  
10 RSAs are only entered into with a small  
11 percentage of OEMs in the ecosystem.

12 Q. Small percentage by number or by  
13 revenue or what metric do you say -- say that?

14 A. Traditionally, the RSAs are only  
15 entered into with partners who are delivering  
16 significant device volume and have the prospect  
17 of successfully competing with Apple and  
18 iPhone.

19 Q. And just in case it's not clear, I  
20 would like it to be clear, I am now questioning  
21 you in your capacity as Google's corporate  
22 representative on topics that we just  
23 discussed. Is that understood?

24 A. I understand.

25 Q. Thank you. And just going back to

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2 what he is saying here?

3 MR. POMERANTZ: Object to the form.

4 A. I believe that's what he might be  
5 saying.

6 Q. In fact, one of the terms in the  
7 RSAs, at least in some of the tiers is, in  
8 fact, to prevent OEMs from preinstalling  
9 competing app stores to Google Play?

10 A. In which timeframe?

11 Q. Currently.

12 A. There is a device by device election  
13 that OEMs can opt into with respect to revenue  
14 share, but this e-mail was five years in  
15 advance of -- the timing is a little bit off in  
16 terms of what Tanuj is saying.

17 Q. When did Google first impose any  
18 provision in any RSA that entitled an OEM to a  
19 certain revenue share if it agreed not to  
20 preinstall a competing app store to Google  
21 Play?

22 A. I think there were some Play revenue  
23 share deals in advance of my arrival in Android  
24 that contemplated those kinds of provisions and  
25 I think that in late 2019, early 2020, the

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2 notion of Play revenue share began to be

3 introduced into a subset of OEM deals.

4 Q. So separate from the type of revenue

5 share that OEM might get, right, whether it's

6 Search or Play, set that aside for a moment.

7 I'm asking whether -- when Google imposed the

8 restriction in any RSA tier or agreement that

9 restricted the OEM from installing a competing

10 app store to Google Play?

11 A. I think in the early 2020 timeframe.

12 Q. So before early 2020, Google did not

13 have a restriction in any RSA, in any tier of

14 any RSA that prevented an OEM from

15 preinstalling a competitive app store?

16 A. I, with the exception of two deals

17 that predated my arrival there, are materials

18 I'm not familiar with, so I don't want to

19 presume there are restrictions or language in

20 those agreements, the device by device tiering

21 in connection with package install permissions

22 was introduced in early 2020 I believe.

23 Q. The last paragraph here from

24 Mr. Raja suggests that there be "an overall

25 strategic discussion on how to bring OEMs

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2 thinking was when I wrote this note.

3 Q. Without disclosing any legal advice,  
4 generally do you have a recollection of what  
5 you were referring to here even if not  
6 specifically?

7 A. I do not.

8 Q. With respect to the RSAs, you're  
9 familiar with the term RSA3.0, right?

10 A. I am, yes.

11 Q. You were part of a team that worked  
12 on the new RSA3.0 template for OEMs, other than  
13 [REDACTED] correct?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. And [REDACTED] wasn't part of that  
16 process because it was on a separate track,  
17 separate project, right?

18 A. It was a different cadence, yes.

19 Q. And a separate project, right?

20 A. They had a different timeline and a  
21 different deal than the other OEMs; that is  
22 correct.

23 Q. So, the RSA3.0 template was intended  
24 to be used for all OEMs that were going to be  
25 getting an RSA other than [REDACTED] right?

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2 A. I don't think so, but I have not  
3 seen the precise analysis for each OEM for the  
4 tiers that were associated with the deals.

5 Q. Sitting here today, you're not aware  
6 of any instance of that?

7 A. Aside from the potential [REDACTED]  
8 example?

9 Q. Right. So other than the potential  
10 [REDACTED] example, sitting here today you were  
11 not aware of any instance where a device being  
12 added to an RSA did not make Google money?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. You presented RSA3.0 to the business  
15 council at Google; is that right?

16 A. I don't know if it was me that  
17 presented it.

18 Q. You worked on a presentation that  
19 was presented to the business council on  
20 RSA3.0?

21 A. I think the presentation was worked  
22 on by Anna and delivered by Anna, but I'm not a  
23 hundred percent sure.

24 Q. Separate from who was the speaker,  
25 you were familiar with and contributed to the



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2 actual physical or digital presentation that  
3 was prepared in connection with that meeting;  
4 is that right?

5 A. Yes, I was.

6 Q. If you could go to your Exhibit  
7 Share to Exhibit 624.

8 (Whereupon document was marked  
9 Exhibit 624 for identification as of this  
10 date.)

11 Q. And while you're pulling that up,  
12 this is Google-Play 004488106.R through --

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. One moment. Loading. I'm looking  
15 for the last Bates number. Through 4488164.R.  
16 Do you have it open?

17 A. This is Exhibit 624?

18 Q. Correct. Yes, I do.

19 Q. This is the presentation that we  
20 just discussed that you were involved in  
21 preparing that was ultimately presented to the  
22 business council about RSA3.0?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And this document was created and  
25 maintained in the ordinary course of business

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2 at Google?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. The title is "Google Distribution On  
5 The Android Framework." Do you see that?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. That's another name for RSA3.0; is  
8 that fair?

9 A. I think that's fair, yes.

10 Q. It mentions here that it was also  
11 presented to PEX. Can you explain what P-E-X  
12 is?

13 A. I believe it stands for platforms in  
14 ecosystems cross functional team or it's a  
15 group that also reviews deals that are smaller  
16 in school than what BC reviews.

17 Q. Did it serve in this instance as a  
18 prereview before RSA3.0 went to business  
19 council?

20 A. I don't know. I don't recall if it  
21 went to PEX first.

22 Q. So I take it you don't recall the  
23 PEX presentation or whether you attended or  
24 not?

25 A. That is correct.

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2 A. That is correct, yes.

3 Q. And because of their rapid growth,  
4 Google viewed those OEMs as strategically  
5 important to try to include them in RSA  
6 agreements that would provide the benefits to  
7 Google that we discussed earlier?

8 A. We wanted to more closely align with  
9 them because they were not only successful in  
10 growing, but they were also developing devices  
11 that had a high probability of competing  
12 successfully or more successfully versus  
13 iPhone.

14 Q. They also had experience with their  
15 own app store, correct?

16 A. Yes, by virtue of having to create  
17 app stores and operate app stores in the  
18 Chinese market.

19 Q. So all of those OEMs had the  
20 potential to have app stores that competed with  
21 Google Play in markets outside of China?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. If you go to the next slide ending  
24 8109. Are you there?

25 A. Sorry.

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2 Q. Then with respect to the final tier,  
3 it's called Google Forward. That's also  
4 referred to as the premier tier elsewhere; is  
5 that right?

6 A. The premier tier, yes, that is  
7 correct.

8 Q. And the idea of the premier tier was  
9 that it would be used on high end Android  
10 devices?

11 A. I think it could be used on any  
12 devices that the OEM elected to enroll the  
13 devices -- enroll in the tier.

14 Q. Again, like the optimized tier, the  
15 premier tier would be entered into on a device  
16 by device level, right?

17 A. That is correct, yes.

18 Q. But in order to be in the premier  
19 tier, you also have to have that same device in  
20 the optimized tier?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. But some of the requirements are  
23 listed here in terms of what would be required  
24 on the OEM's part for that device to qualify  
25 for the premier tier; is that right?

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2 Chinese OEMs that had alternative app stores  
3 were being contemplated to receive double or  
4 more than double Google Play rev share than the  
5 OEMs that did not have those alternative app  
6 stores, correct?

7 A. The economic compensation for Play  
8 Store was reflected differently in different  
9 deals. So I'm not drawing the correlation  
10 between the prior slide and the reps of their  
11 stores as much as I am their ability to compete  
12 with iPhone and our desire for them to create  
13 devices that could compete successfully versus  
14 iPhone.

15 Q. Well, part of participation in the  
16 Google premier tier was exclusive preinstall of  
17 Google Play to the exclusion of any alternative  
18 app stores, correct?

19 A. As part of the out of box  
20 experience, correct.

21 Q. Which is why I said preinstall. So  
22 part of the ability to get into the premier  
23 tier, the OEM had to agree not to preinstall  
24 any other app store other than Google Play,  
25 correct?

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2 A. I believe that's the case, yes.

3 Q. And that means for the Chinese OEMs  
4 like Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo, et cetera, that they  
5 would have to forego their alternative app  
6 stores that they already had and preinstall  
7 only Google Play for their device launches,  
8 correct?

9 A. If they elected to enroll devices in  
10 this tier, correct.

11 Q. Right and to make it worth their  
12 while, Google had to offer a higher Play rev  
13 share to incentivize those OEMs to forego  
14 preinstalling their own app store, right?

15 A. I wouldn't necessarily draw that  
16 conclusion.

17 Q. You don't draw that conclusion in  
18 any way, shape or form?

19 A. I think that our desire was to align  
20 particularly closely with those OEMs who were  
21 competing particularly well in our minds  
22 relative to Apple.

23 Q. What did making them install Google  
24 Play to the exclusion of their own app stores  
25 do for that goal?

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2 A. They would make it much more  
3 equivalent to the app store experience or the  
4 app download experience that is offered on  
5 iPhones versus going to a new Android phone and  
6 seeing multiple app stores which could create  
7 confusion and cause a user to question whether  
8 or not this is the kind of device or ecosystem  
9 they want to be in.

10 Q. So you think that a consumer faced  
11 with more than one store option on their  
12 Android devices is a negative user experience?

13 A. As part of the out of box  
14 experience, it is my belief that the competing  
15 with Apple iPhone requires the most efficient  
16 experience possible to be successful.

17 Q. One way for an OEM to be successful,  
18 however, would be to pay Google no money in  
19 connection with apps downloaded onto its  
20 devices through alternative app stores, right?

21 A. I'm sorry, can you repeat the  
22 question?

23 Q. An OEM that has its own app store  
24 where users can download apps outside of Google  
25 Play through those alternative app stores we

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2 discussed earlier, those OEMs pay Google  
3 0-dollars in connection with those downloads or  
4 the in-app purchases that are made on the apps,  
5 correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So in order to use Google Play, an  
8 app -- the OEM gives up all of that money,  
9 correct?

10 A. Oh, if they elect to not preload  
11 their store; that is correct.

12 Q. So in order for an OEM to decide  
13 instead of downloading my own app store where I  
14 make money and go to Google Play where I make  
15 no money, Google has to give those OEMs actual  
16 money to incentivize them to make that trade,  
17 right?

18 MR. POMERANTZ: Objection to the  
19 form.

20 A. It was a matter of giving them a  
21 choice and recognizing potential opportunity  
22 cost of that choice.

23 Q. Right and the opportunity cost to  
24 OEMs that had actual alternative competing app  
25 stores was higher than for OEMs that did not



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2 yet have an alternative app store that could  
3 compete with Google Play, right?

4 A. I think that -- I can't precisely  
5 say exactly why these particular OEMs and if it  
6 was correlated to their own stores. I don't  
7 recall hearing that.

8 Q. I'm asking a separate question. The  
9 opportunity costs to OEMs that already had  
10 competing app stores was higher than for OEMs  
11 that do not yet have an alternative app store  
12 that could compete with Google Play, correct?

13 MR. POMERANTZ: Object to the form.

14 A. Well, I think it depends on how the  
15 device -- how the OEMs have decided to get to  
16 the device with respect to other stores that  
17 might include third party stores as well.

18 Q. So you're not willing to acknowledge  
19 that an OEM that had the ability to launch a  
20 competing alternative app store and have rev  
21 share in connection with those stores had  
22 higher opportunity costs for dropping those  
23 alternative stores as preinstalls than for OEMs  
24 that did not have their own alternative app  
25 store?